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I perhaps took the title of this conference too seriously, and I
therefore request you remember its title when I discuss the possi-
bility of establishing a requirement of some kind of hearing for all
persons discharged from employment, including private employ-
ment. Obviously the law is far from imposing such a requirement
now. Nevertheless I feel confident in making the suggestion that
a development of that sort will occur before the twenty-first cen-
tury. The problem is: "How will it occur?" Those who have a par-
ticular interest in administrative law have much to contribute to
the solution.
Presently the law is that unless there is an express understand-
ing to the contrary a contract of employment with no fixed term is
terminable at will and without cause by either party. Perhaps
some of you would prefer not to characterize this as a doctrine of
contract law but only as a preferred construction for contracts of
employment. In any event most persons who are employed by
private employers and not represented by a labor union work
under a contract of employment which can be terminated without
cause or even for a bad cause.
Thus a cashier-checker at a supermarket can be told that her
services are no longer wanted. When she asks for an explanation,
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management can tell her it does not have to give a reason. When
that cashier-checker seeks employment at another supermarket,
she will be asked where she worked before and .why her employ-
ment was terminated. When she says her former employer would
not state why her employment was terminated, you know what
the prospective employer is going to conclude. The prospective
employer will conclude that she had her hand in the till, and it
will not want to expose its own till to such a risk.
Or, to take the facts of a case to which I will refer later, suppose
a salesman for a manufacturer of steel pipe has an engineering
background and realizes that he is supposed to sell pipe for in-
dustrial purposes for which he believes the pipe is not sufficiently
strong. He tells his sales manager that he does not believe they
should be marketing this steel pipe for those purposes because it
cannot stand the pressures of such use. The sales manager tells
him that his job is to sell the pipe and not to raise such questions.
The salesman is a friend of a vice president in the manufacturing
division of the company. In conversation with the vice president
the salesman brings the attention of the vice president to the fact
that they are selling this pipe for purposes which make its use
dangerous. An order is issued by the manufacturing division to
stop selling the pipe for those purposes. Another order also
comes out of the sales division and it is that the salesman's em-
ployment is terminated. Now, as the law stands, neither the cash-
ier-checker nor the salesman has any remedy.
A familiar aspect of the judicial process is that change in one
area produces such tensions in other areas that change in the lat-
ter areas becomes inevitable. I believe such a situation has devel-
oped today. It is fairly obvious that decisions of the Supreme
Court in the 1970s confer due process protection for interests of
less importance than the interests of an employee in the continu-
ation of his private employment and in the protection of his repu-
tation from an unjust dismissal.1 Please remember that in the
employment area about which I am talking there is no require-
ment of a hearing of any kind. In' contrast, recent decisions of the
Supreme Court have required pretermination hearings for these
lesser interests even though there would be a subsequent hearing
on the merits.2
Not all employees work under employment contracts which can
be terminated without cause. More than one out of seven persons
1. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver's license
and vehicle registration); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of
welfare benefits).
2. See cases cited note 1 supra.
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in the American work force is employed by a government. More
than half of the persons employed by a government have the pro-
tection of a civil service law. Those who do not have the protec-
tion of a civil service law have found that decisions from the 1970s
provide that the Constitution can also be called upon for protec-
tion. For example, Elrod v. Burns3 shows that the Constitution
gives job protection against discharges under the spoils system
even though no civil service law provides protection. The deci-
sions in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth4 and Bishop v.
Wood5 deny constitutional protection to government employees,
but the earlier decisions recognizing due process claims with re-
spect to public employment have not been overruled.
The sharp contrast between the protection available to public
employees and that available to private employees should cause
us to ask whether there is justification for that difference. The
justification for law that permits termination of employment with-
out cause grows even more difficult when consideration is given
the fact that twenty-five percent of the private non-agricultural
work force is now represented by labor unions. 6 About ninety-five
percent of the collective bargaining agreements contain grievance
and arbitration provisions which lead to final and binding arbitra-
tion before a neutral independent arbitrator in cases involving
discipline or discharge.7 In those arbitration proceedings the bur-
den is on the employer to prove just cause for the discharge.8 It is
true that the individual employee does not have a right to have a
grievance taken to arbitration. Basically, he must rely upon his
union and convince its officers that his case is good enough to
merit being brought to the higher level of the grievance proce-
dure. But if he has exhausted the attempts to get the union to do
that, then under Vaca v. Sipes9 he is able to sue both his em-
ployer andhis union. His suit against the union would be based
upon a claim that it was guilty of a breach of duty of fair repre-
3. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
4. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
5. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
6. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, DIRECTORY OF NA-
TIONAL UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS 72 (1973).
7. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-1, MA-
JOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES 1, 8 (1965).
8. E. ELKiouia & F. ELKoURI, How ARBrrRATION WORKS 621 (3d ed. 1973).
9. 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967).
sentation.10 The claim against the employer is for discharge with-
out cause."1 The recent 1976 decision of Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc.,12 held that liability could be imposed upon an em-
ployer even where an award sustaining the discharge had been
rendered if the union failed to perform its duty of fair representa-
tion in presenting the case to the arbitrator. The case has radia-
tions indicating the duty of fair representation requires minimum
levels of performance and that liability may be established with
proof of less than arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith treatment
of the employee by the union.
We can see in this country a general movement favoring pro-
tecting people from discharge based upon reasons which are
thought not to justify the discharge. The Civil Rights Act of 196413
reflects that kind of judgment and protects employees from many
kinds of discrimination, including discharge because of race, sex,
national origin, or religion. Another federal statute prohibits dis-
charge based upon age.' 4 A number of states and the federal gov-
ernment now give some protection against discrimination based
upon physical handicap.15 Indeed the gay liberation movement
has succeeded in obtaining protection at a local level from termi-
nation of employment based upon consideration of an employee's
sexual preferences. I may be stodgy but I do not see a great soci-
etal interest in a program to protect the people who are involved
in the gay liberation front as such. However, their protection can
be viewed as an aspect of general protection of human dignity.
The right of a person to choose the way he wishes to live, and the
right not to suffer consequences on the job because of personal
preferences unless there is a job relationship, fit easily into tradi-
tional concepts of human dignity and liberty. I think we have
moved in protecting against specific violation of human dignity so
far that we will give protection to the dignity of the individual
who finds himself discharged without explanation or hearing.
From where will the force for this change come? We know the
origins of the Civil Rights Act are found in very large part in the
disturbances that occurred to protest racial discrimination. Even
Senator Dirksen knew something had to be done! Are we going to
get anything of this sort for persons working under contracts of
employment terminable at will? I doubt there will be a political
10. Id. at 177.
11. Id. at 186.
12. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
13. Pub. L. No. 352, 78 Stat. 255 (codified in scattered sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.).
14. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1976).
15. See Gurmanldn v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977); Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
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movement which will accomplish the adoption of legislation
changing that law. Legislation occurs because there are inter-
ested and effective lobbying groups that bring about the adoption
of proposed legislation. Employers will not propose such a
change. Understandably they would seek to preserve their pres-
ently unrestrained control of employment. I do not think we can
expect unions to press for this change in the law. One of the most
persuasive organizational arguments a union now has is that it
will give job protection to employees if they make it their collec-
tive bargaining agent.
Therefore, I think we have an area appropriate for judicial activ-
ism. The judiciary may not be able to act in a comprehensive
way, producing the total solution, but it is able to act as a catalyst
and produce changes that direct a legislature's attention to the
need for a comprehensive reform. There are constitutional argu-
ments which can be made to persuade the judiciary to extend
protection against improper termination of employment to per-
sons in private employment.
Rejection of the employment at will doctrine would be a com-
plete reversal of the 1908 position of the Supreme Court in Adair
v. United States,16 which found a constitutional right of an em-
ployer to contract to discharge at will. In today's world, contrary
constitutional argument can be based on deprivation of equal pro-
tection of laws. The description given of the protections available
to public employees under civil service laws, and even more so
the protection enjoyed by persons employed under collective bar-
gaining agreements, strongly suggests that people working in pri-
vate employment without collective bargaining suffer from a very
obvious unequal protection of laws. Of course if a court uses the
"rational basis" test17 for equal protection scrutiny, I suppose a
rational basis can be found for distinguishing between private
employment and civil service. Maybe a rational basis can be
found for distinguishing between private employees who have un-
ions and those who do not have unions because the distinction
does encourage the important national policy of collective bar-
gaining. But if (as seems likely) we depart from the two levels of
scrutiny in equal protection cases, is it not possible that we could
16. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
17. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40
(1972).
recognize the interest in employment to be so great that a chal-
lenge on the basis of denial of equal protection of laws will be ac-
cepted?
There is of course one more complication which I should men-
tion. The lack of equal protection of the laws in this area does not
come solely from state law. Indeed most of the inequality of pro-
tection has come from federal law which encourages collective
bargaining and has established arbitration as a king-pin of the na-
tional labor policy. While this is not the traditional equal protec-
tion situation, it is not outrageous to suggest that equal protection
requires examination of the entire context in which a law oper-
ates.
There remains the question of whether a discharge from private
employment now has taken on characteristics of state action.
Certainly the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Jackson v. Met-
ropolitan Edison Co.,18 which involved termination of electrical
services, and in the earlier Moose Lodge case,19 indicate that the
Court is not likely to find state action on the basis of government
involvement with incorporation, or government involvement with
regard to the regulation of the activity of employers even though
there is a very close supervision of the discharge decisions made
by employers.
Perhaps a little stronger argument is that judicial process in-
volves state action. Here I refer to Shelley v. Kraemer,20 involving
the enforcement of restrictive covenants, Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corp.,2 1 involving prejudgment garnishment, Fuentes v.
Shevin,22 involving repossession of property, and New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,23 involving defamation laws. In each of these
cases it was made easier to find state action because a sheriff or
deputies acted and thus an identifiable public officer did some-
thing somewhere in the process. But maybe we should recognize
that this test of state action serves us no better than the right-
privilege dichotomy, controlling when one is entitled to a hearing,
which we rejected because it did not serve the needs of our soci-
ety. Our society has become so complex that we should also rec-
ognize that the difference between misfeasance and nonfeasance
is not an adequate basis for deciding what government must do.
The failure of the courts to provide protection against unjust dis-
charge may now be found to constitute a state policy permitting
18. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
19. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
20. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
21. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
22. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
23. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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(and thus condoning if not approving) arbitrary, discriminatory,
and unjust treatment of employees in private employment.
Should such a policy be held to satisfy the requirement of due
process developed in the decisions of the 1970s? Is it what has
been called "the sovereign prerogative of choice" to permit pri-
vate parties to act on an illegitimate basis? If so, Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority24 provides some support for the
proposition that nonfeasance is state action. Or to pick up what
Professor Rabin has said concerning the rationale of providing the
means for a person to ask the basis for what the state has done to
him,25 the anguish of a person would be just as great in asking
why the state has permitted people to do harm to him. That is
not much of a change in the question, and it may be that similar
questions should get similar answers.
It seems to me that the most likely basis for finding state action
is to be found in the lawmaking function of the judiciary. Judicial
realism provides a basis for finding state action. When we
thought judges only "found" law it was not so obvious that there
was state action involved in the formulation of the common law.
But California's repeal of the anti-discrimination laws by amend-
ment of its constitution was held to be state action in Reitman v.
Mulkey.26 It seems not much of a step to say that state law which
continues the employment at will doctrine is state action and sub-
ject to constitutional challenge.
Wisconsin v. Constantineau27 involved a woman who was in ef-
fect publicly declared a drunkard, one to whom liquor was not to
be sold. The injury to reputation was found to be unconstitu-
tional.28 Is a law which permits injury to reputation by an unjus-
tified discharge also unconstitutional? Paul v. Davis,2 9 involving
circulation by police of leaflets carrying pictures of suspected
shoplifters, is a case which points in the other direction by refus-
ing to give constitutional protection to the interest in reputation.
Ingraham v. Wright3o found constitutional protection unneces-
24. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
25. See Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between Fundamental Val-
ues and Procedural Safeguards in Constitutional Right to Hearing Cases, 16 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 301, 303 (1979).
26. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
27. 400 U.S. 433, 435 (1971).
28. Id. at 436.
29. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
30. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
sary for injury by corporal punishment administered by school
officials. Those cases leave the protection to state tort law. But in
their denial of constitutional protection we may find the basis for
requiring constitutional protection in employment. In those cases
state tort law could be pointed to as providing a remedy. But
when we look at the situation of the employee in private employ-
ment, we must conclude there is no protection.
The recent decision in Board of Curators of the University of
Missouri v. Horowitz31 suggested a lesser due process require-
ment for an academic dismissal than what would be required for
a disciplinary dismissal, and cuts against the suggestion that the
employment interest deserves constitutional protection. It sug-
gests the Court will be unwilling to undertake consideration of
questions of job competence.
Perhaps the Supreme Court, reconstituted by new appoint-
ments, will return to the precedents which are more supportive of
protecting the interest in job security. It is my personal belief
that the manner in which recent changes in constitutional law
have been made has been so unprincipled that much of the prior
law has been left standing. It would therefore be possible for fu-
ture members of the Court to note that the older cases were not
overruled, that the more recent developments were obvious wan-
derings from the true law, and to declare a return to the true law.
I think, however, the development in the protection against un-
justified termination of employment is likely to occur in the devel-
opment by a state court of principles of tort law or contract law.
This obviously could occur without involving the approval of the
United States Supreme Court as it is presently constituted, and
without requiring the overruling of recent decisions of that Court.
Powerful arguments for providing such protection through tort
law were made more than ten years ago in an article by Professor
Blades.32 His work, and the work of others, established that the
rule which we take so much for granted is not the rule followed in
Europe; indeed it is not'the rule followed in most of the world.33
The peculiar American rule is based upon an erroneous state-
ment in a nineteenth century treatise.34 This erroneous state-
ment of the law became accepted as the law of employment in the
United States.
As long ago as 1959 a court of appeal in California recognized a
31. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
32. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abu-
sive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rv. 1404 (1967).
33. Blumrosen, Employer Discipline: U.S. Report, 18 RUTGERs L. REV. 428, 432-
33 (1964).
34 J. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877).
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limitation on the employment at will doctrine where the dis-
charge of an employee was based on his failure to commit perjury
before a legislative committee.35 The Supreme Court of Indiana
in 1973 held actionable a discharge for filing a workmen's compen-
sation claim, saying the discharge constituted a statutorily prohib-
ited device for avoiding the workmen's compensation law.3 6 A
Michigan appellate court reached the same conclusion concerning
the filing of a workmen's compensation claim even though there
was no statutory provision on which it could rely.
37
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in 1974, in the case of
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,38 created an exception to the termi-
nable at will doctrine of employment for a termination motivated
by bad faith or malice. The facts are worth noting. A foreman
working on a swing shift apparently was attracted to one of the
women who worked the shift, and proposed that they should go
out together after the shift. She, very morally and righteously, re-
minded him that she was a married woman and refused. The alle-
gations of the complaint and the proof at trial were that with the
connivance of the personnel manager the foreman had her dis-
charged. The New Hampshire court said that this was such a bad
faith and malicious discharge that damages could be obtained
even though the woman's employment was at wi1.39
I might mention in this respect one of the developments in the
Civil Rights Act with regard to sex discrimination. I think three
courts have reached the conclusion that there is a violation of the
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex when an
employer permits the situation to exist in which a male supervi-
sor makes job improvements for the woman under his supervision
conditioned upon compliance with his sexual demands. 40 I feel
35. Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188-
89, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959) (right to discharge at will may be limited by statute or by
public policy; in this case, public policy proscribed dismissal for refusal to commit
perjury).
36. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
37. Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
38. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
39. Id. at 133, 134, 316 A.2d at 551, 552.
40. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court reversed sum-
mary judgment for the defendant employer and held that civil rights violations
need not affect all employees of a similar class and that employers are liable for
the title VII violations of their supervisory personnel); Tomkins v. Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654
(D.D.C. 1976). But see Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
rather sure that Representative Hayes did not have this in mind
when he voted for this legislation, and I do not really think that
was the purpose of the legislation. But these results indicate how
desperate judges are to provide protection to persons discharged
from employment without valid justification.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1974 refused to make an
exception to the employment at will doctrine.41 The case involved
the salesman who believed that pipe was not safe for the uses for
which he was told that it should be sold. It was a four to three
decision. There is a very, very strong dissent, which I think
shows the vitality of the argument against preserving or continu-
ing the employment at will doctrine.42 The Oregon Supreme
Court in 1975 found a prima facie tort, and concluded damages
should be awarded, for the termination of the employment of a
woman who had responded to a call to do jury service. 43 Of
course there is a community or public interest in such a case that
might differentiate it from some other types of discharge. The
Supreme Court of Washington recently refused to make an excep-
tion to the employment at will doctrine for bad faith discharges. 44
However, in the course of its decision the court indicated its re-
ceptiveness to the argument that the exception should be made
by stating: "While the future of this doctrine is a compelling issue,
it is one that must be left for another day and different facts." 45
The case for recognizing exceptions to the employment at will
doctrine is compelling. I think we can also recognize that such a
change may produce a caseload that would overwhelm the courts.
Here, I suppose, those of us interested in administrative law
might provide some assistance. One possibility is that courts
could do something like what the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia did with cases arising under the United Mine Work-
ers pension trust. In Kosty v. Lewis,46 the court held that when a
change in the eligibility rules for retirement is to be made, the
trustees must give sufficient notice to persons who are otherwise
qualified for retirement, permitting them to take action before
they become disqualified.4 7 It seems to me that what the court of
Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975) (no employer liabil-
ity for isolated acts of employee where employer has no discriminatory policy or
practice). See Comment, Title VII. Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassment,
-53 WAsH. L REV. 123 (1977).
41. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 175, 319 A.2d 174, 176 (1974).
42. Id. at 186-92, 319 A.2d at 181-84 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
43. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
44. Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977).
45. Id. at 898, 568 P.2d at 770.
46. 319 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 964 (1964).
47. Id. at 749.
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appeals did in Kosty v. Lewis provides an analogy applicable to
the employment area, in that the court looked to see whether or
not the trustees had handled the case in a reasonable manner. In
doing so, the court drew support from the background of equity
jurisdiction, which traditionally has supervised administration of
trusts. In these days, when equity and law are merged, do we
need to limit the function of the equity courts to supervising
trusts rather than to "doing equity" generally?
I suppose Goss v. Lopez4 8 provides another possibility. Courts
could insist that an employer who is going to terminate an em-
ployee at least give that employee a statement of reasons for the
discharge; otherwise that discharge would be considered to be in
bad faith.
Professor Clyde Summers has proposed the establishment of a
statutory scheme utilizing the existing corps of labor law arbitra-
tors to resolve disputes concerning unjustified terminations of
employment.49 It is a very provocative suggestion. It has the ap-
peal that there is an established corps of labor arbitrators who
frequently and regularly handle cases of claimed unjust dis-
charge. I have my doubts that arbitrators have sufficient free time
to take on all of the additional cases that would come to them if
the rule requiring just cause for discharge were applied to the un-
organized portion of the private sector of employment.
Another solution could be to enlarge the jurisdiction of the vari-
ous state and federal agencies now hearing claims of particular
types of improper discharge. Perhaps we can combine all the
agencies concerned with unjust discharge in one agency, and that
agency could be a labor court that would pass upon all questions
of whether or not a termination of employment was for just and
proper reasons.
With regard to the question of what kind of hearing would be
required, experience with labor arbitration suggests that a full ju-
dicial-type hearing is necessary and practical. The "new law"
should require what is very close to a judicial evidentiary pro-
ceeding in which the employer has the burden of proving just
cause for discharge. Let me remind you that the large number of
labor arbitration decisions concerning what constitutes just cause
48. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
49. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal, 62 VA. L REV.
481, 519-32 (1976).
for discharge could provide the basis for the development of judi-
cial rule.
We might find as we get into this area that we are going to have
problems deciding what kinds of discipline less than discharge
will be subject to a hearing requirement. This is obviously some-
thing for which a legislative solution would be better. The legisla-
ture can draw the arbitrary limits which the judiciary might find
difficult to enunciate or justify. The problem is not insurmount-
able.
We will also have problems about the right to representation by
attorney, provision of attorneys' fees, etc. Those problems will of
course keep us much busier once the right of employees to a
hearing is recognized. We should not undertake the venture as a
make-work program for lawyers. It should be undertaken only if
we believe it to be a refinement of justice we can afford. I think it
is almost certain that it will be recognized sometime before the
twenty-first century that an employee in private employment is
entitled to a hearing before a discharge becomes final. It is up to
us to give thought to what kind of a workable system we can es-
tablish to protect that very important interest in continued em-
ployment and employability.
